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Abstract: This paper presents an overview of the BRAHMS and GEOCAST projects and focuses on 
the security aspects of both projects.  An overview of IPSEC and its variation called multi layer 
IPSEC is presented together with an overview of secure multicast key distribution architectures such 
as Logical Key Hierarchy.  Finally the paper proposes an interworking solution between multi layer 
IPSEC and Logical Key Hierarchy architecture. 
 1. INTRODUCTION TO BRAHMS AND GEOCAST IST PROJECTS 
Demand continues to grow for broadband networks capable of supporting applications such as 
multimedia and information distribution, and one important component of a communications 
architecture that can support these services is multicast.  However, terrestrial IP multicast has only 
slowly been deployed, due to the complexities of wide scale networks that include large numbers of 
multicast-enabled routers.  This situation is expected to continue at least for the foreseeable future, 
restricting accessibility to multicast content for most potential European users.  In contrast, a satellite 
service could simplify multicast deployment and operations/maintenance, since a single satellite hop 
(using only a small number of multicast enabled routers) would provide uniform delivery across the 
whole footprint of the EC.  
Satellite revenues in the next few years are increasingly likely to come from the delivery of these IP-
based applications and services, either to complement terrestrial broadband services, or to offer 
added-value services in some niche markets.  The challenge for the next generation of satellite 
systems is therefore to define a common basis for efficient integration of satellites in IP-centric 
telecommunication networks.  Satellite access, rather than long-distance transport, is seen as a 
particularly convenient element of the overall telecommunication infrastructure, since it provides 
ubiquitous broadband access to anyone deploying a satellite terminal, both for single residential users 
and SOHO / corporate networks.  
Satellites are also ideally suited for delivery of multicast applications, including multimedia content 
distribution.  The next generation of satellites will extend the coverage offered by satellite services, 
while increasingly utilizing standardized components to reduce terminal cost. GEO satellite systems 
are particularly well-suited to multicast, since a single transmission is able to be received by all 
terminals within a wide coverage area.  If these systems can be optimised to simultaneously support 
multicast download of bulk content and streaming of real-time multicast content, they will provide a 
flexible and economic IP multicast delivery platform.  
In particular, there is a large interest in the study of GEO (Geostationary Earth Orbit) system 
solutions, which aim at providing a functionally transparent integration of satellites in Internet 
networks.  Satellite systems based on a variety of different technologies are currently being defined 
and developed, and are tailored to support specific multimedia services and user requirements. 
Current satellite platforms are often proprietary and rely on DVB (MPEG/DVB), ATM 
(Asynchronous Transfer Mode), or ATM-like technologies. They cover a more or less wide range of 
service provisioning over transparent or regenerative satellites and support multimedia in variable 
proportion, whether broadcast or multicast point-to-multi-point or multi-point-to-point, or bi-
directional traffic (symmetrical or asymmetrical), or point-to-point. 
As such the challenge for the next generation of satellite access systems is to define a common basis 
for efficient integration of satellites in IP-centric telecommunication networks. Therefore, a generic 
satellite system architecture, access system and terminal architecture, based on IP services and 
incorporating the above qualities, is essential.  The need for standardisation in broadband satellite 
systems has been recognized by industry and has resulted in the setting up of a working group on 
Broadband Satellite Multimedia (BSM) in ETSI SES.  Also these issues and network security are 
currently addressed by two European IST research projects:  BRAHMS and GEOCAST. 
1.1. Overview of BRAHMS project 
The IST-BRAHMS (BRoadband Access for High speed Multimedia via Satellite) project [BRAH01] 
has been partially funded by the EC in the frame of its FP5 and has been completed in December 
2001. Its objective was to define a universal communication infrastructure for a broadband access via 
satellite (see Figure 1) suitable for different satellite system implementations and with the aim of 
harmonizing most of the common satellite access network functions.  The network elements identified 
in the BRAHMS reference architecture are: 
• BSATs (BRAHMS Satellite Access Terminals) are routers interfacing the user segment through 
standard terrestrial network configurations, for example PPPoE (PPP over Ethernet), PPP/USB, or 
IP/Ethernet. One BSAT can directly interface with several user segments.  
• BHSs (BRAHMS Hub Stations) are routers interfacing with MANs or WANs through various 
technologies using link-layer and physical layer protocols such as ATM over SDH, or ATM over 
ADSL, or Fast Ethernet.  
• The Satellite payload can be transparent, providing only layer 1 connectivity (at frequency 
channel, carrier or time-slot level), or it can be regenerative thus providing layer 2 packet 
connectivity. The connectivity can be static or quasi-static in the case of a layer 1 transparent 
satellite, and more dynamic in the case of a layer 2 packet switching satellite.  
• A NCC (Network Control Centre) is responsible for control and management of the satellite 
access network including BSATs and BHSs.  These responsibilities include satellite 
communications functions and allocation of resources (radio spectrum and addressing). NCC 
functions are often co-located with BHSs.  
The satellite access flexibility of the BRAHMS architecture (e.g. for frequency, access type, orbit) is 
obtained by separating physically-related functions from common service functions: the higher layer 
Radio-Technology Independent (RTI) access network functions “hide” the lower layer Radio-
Technology Dependent (RTD) functions from the user and the core network.  The common RTI 
layers in the user (BSAT) and hub (BHS) stations in the access network support a full range of 
multimedia services (e.g. broadband and Internet) and connections to alternative customer premises 
and core networks.  In this way, the transport and delivery of IP-based applications and services 
seamlessly complements the available terrestrial broadband services.  The architecture also enables, in 
some niche markets, added-value services compared to terrestrial networks.  
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Figure 1  BRAHMS architecture 
The BRAHMS project has developed a general model for an IP-oriented satellite architecture in 
which a range of existing and future satellite technologies can be accommodated and exploited by IP-
based applications.  Such a satellite system concept, relying directly on IP technology, brings 
advantages in terms of simplification of components, mechanisms and interfaces.  This general model 
addresses not only satellite transport, but also issues related to IP networking, such as: IP QoS 
(Quality of Service) provision, IPv4 and IPv6 mobility support, multicast support, security and IP 
performance enhancement over the satellite link (header compression, TCP spoofing).  These features 
are offered independently of the satellite technology employed. 
This architecture covers several types of connectivity depending on the roles played by the satellite 
system: point-to-point (BSAT-BHS or BSAT-BSAT), point-to-multipoint (BHS-BSATs or BSAT-
BSATs) or multipoint-to-multipoint.   
 
Regarding BRAHMS system security, this project did not address the RTD layers and focused only 
on RTI and the use of IPSEC and Multi-Layer IPSEC (ML-IPSEC) in relation to satellite Performance 
Enhancing Proxy (PEP), which will be presented in the section 2. The ML-IPSEC solution proposed 
in the BRAHMS project has been considered as one of the starting assumption by another IST project 
started recently, SATIP6 (Satellite Broadband Multimedia System for IPv6) [SATI01], where issues 
related to IP security over satellite will be further assessed taking into account also the likely 
evolution towards IPv6.  
1.2. Overview of GEOCAST project 
Research has also been carried out in the area of IP multicast over satellites in the GEOCAST project 
(Multicast Over Geostationary EHF Satellites) [GEOC00], supported by the EU fifth framework 
programme [IST00] The objective of the broadband GEOCAST system is to provide a transport 
technology for network connectivity among end users for a wide range of services and applications.  
A key aspect of these broadband services is the ability of a single network to support multiple 
application types, such as data, video and voice.  GEOCAST focuses on specific multicast 
applications and the infrastructure required to support them.  Service providers and broadband users 
expect the following benefits from GEOCAST’s multicast facilities: 
• Systems features matched to users specific needs (applications); 
• Adaptation of transport parameters to the different application needs: e.g. symmetry, delay 
sensitivity, jitter tolerance and QoS classes; 
• Efficient use of resources . 
The network scenario is presented in Figure 2.  The network uses an on-board cell switch with 36 MF-
TDMA uplinks and 36 TDM downlinks, allowing hundreds of Earth Stations (ES) per spot-beam 
sharing the uplink capacity, and a Network Control Centre (NCC) in charge of managing the network 
resources.  Each ES is connected to a network carrying IP traffic [FAIR02]. A particular feature of 
GEOCAST is that it has been optimised for multicast delivery across different ESs and different spot 
beams.  Like many ATM-style services, the system supports both the Constant Bit Rate (CBR) and 
Unspecified Bit Rate (UBR) traffic classes.   
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Figure 2 GEOCAST network scenario 
In addition, the GEOCAST project addresses multicast security issues over GEO satellites, and 
security systems are being designed both for transparent satellites and for  ATM and MPEG On-Board 
Processing (OBP) satellites.  A particular emphasis is placed on using IPSEC for end-to-end multicast 
security.   
2. OVERVIEW OF IPSEC AND MULTI LAYER IPSEC 
The security architecture of the Internet Protocol known as IP security (IPSEC) is the most advanced 
effort in the standardization of Internet security.  The IPSEC protocol suite is used to provide inter-
operable cryptographically-based security services (i.e. confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and 
non-repudiation) at the IP layer [ATKI98].  It consists of an authentication protocol: Authentication 
Header (AH) [ATAH98], a confidentiality protocol: Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) [ATEP98] 
and it also includes an Internet Security Association Establishment and Key Management Protocol 
(ISAKMP) [MSST98].  These security protocols are designed for both IP version 4 (IPv4) and IP 
version 6 (IPv6) environments. 
As shown in Figure 3, the IP Authentication Header (AH) provides connectionless integrity and data 
origin authentication for IP datagrams.  It can also provide protection against replays.  The 
authentication header may be used, alone or in combination, with the ESP.  AH authenticates slightly 
more information in the IP datagram than does the ESP authentication (the IP datagram header is not 
included in the computation of the cryptographic integrity checksum of ESP).  The authentication 
header protocol has two modes: transport or tunnel. 
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Figure 3 Authentication Header (AH) in transport and tunnel modes 
Transport mode is used only in host-to-host authentication, while tunnel mode can be used between 
two hosts, either host-to-gateway or gateway-to-gateway.  The tunnel allows the host to delegate the 
security service to the gateway.  This is especially interesting for companies with two private distant 
networks connected through the public Internet.  In this mode, the IP header of the host/gateway 
responsible for computing/checking the AH is added while the old IP header is kept in the new IP 
datagram and moved after the AH. The AH does not protect mutable fields of IP datagrams (e.g., 
record route, timestamp, loose source routing and strict source routing options).  These fields are 
specifically excluded from the authentication computation in order to prevent from the occurrence of 
authentication errors. 
The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol, shown in Figure 4, provides a mix of security 
services: data confidentiality, data origin authentication, connectionless integrity and anti-replay.  As 
in the case of AH, the ESP uses a set of fields to identify the service being provided. Some of the 
fields are included in the ESP Header and others in the Trailer. The set of services depends on the 
options selected during security association establishment.  ESP may be used alone or in combination 
with AH.  It is designed to work in transport mode or in tunnel mode. 
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Figure 4 Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) in transport and tunnel modes 
The Security Parameter Index (SPI) field identifies the security association for this datagram (unique 
value for a given IP destination). SPI and destination uniquely identifies a security association.  
Finally, the sequence number is an optional field, and is included only if the anti-replay service is 
selected.   
2.1. IPSEC and Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs) 
Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs) are used to improve the performance of Internet protocols on 
network paths where native performance suffers due to the characteristics of a link or subnetwork 
[PEP01].  In most cases, security applied above the transport layer can be used with PEPs, especially 
transport layer PEPs.  However, today, only a limited number of applications include support for the 
use of transport (or higher) layer security.  Network (IP) layer security such as IPSEC, on the other 
hand, can generally be used by any application, transparently to the application. 
The particular problem posed by the adoption of IPSEC in satellite-based communications is that 
encryption hides all details of higher layer protocols, so making it impossible for any intermediate 
routing and switching node processing of this information.  The recent development of IPSEC in 
IETF is incompatible with a new set of networking paradigms that place more and more controls 
inside the network in intermediate nodes rather than in end nodes.  
In particular, any service that requires knowledge of the TCP header content anywhere other than in 
the end host cannot function if IP packets are encrypted; such services include most firewalls, many 
DiffServ implementations, MPLS (Multi Protocol Label Switching), RSVP and RED (Random Early 
Discard).  Other functions that are affected by IPSEC include TCP spoofing, header compression, 
Network Address Translation, TCP traffic shaping, layer 5 switching, and transparent web caching.  
This could certainly be an issue for any future broadband systems and, in particular, for the BRAHMS 
functional architecture. As a matter of fact, most of the solutions being developed to enhance the 
connectionless best effort service offered by IP over a satellite link have been integrated into 
BRAHMS as strict requirements:  
• Adoption of efficient resources management strategies able to optimise the throughput, 
especially at the TCP layer.  
• Introduction of Quality of Service management for multimedia applications.  
IPSEC encrypts every IP datagram, including the TCP headers that contain information needed for 
satellite gateways to perform TCP PEP or other intelligent routing functions.  Some basic rules for 
TCP optimisation techniques used in satellite communications and the implications they might have 
on the IPSEC security protocols have been pointed out by [GUVA99].  In particular, if the 
optimisation techniques involve intermediate routers and require read or write access to the TCP 
encapsulated data, the IPSEC services cannot be used without some kind of interfering with security 
or adaptation.  
Some work on the subject has been carried out recently by Hughes Network Systems [YONG99]. 
This IPSEC extension has been called Multi Layer-IPSEC (ML-IPSEC): it defines a complex security 
relationship that involves not only the sender and the receiver of a security service, but also selected 
intermediate nodes along the traffic stream.  The main idea is to divide the IP datagram into several 
zones and apply different protection schemes to each zone (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5 ML-IPSEC datagram structure 
2.2. Multi Layer IPSEC in the BRAHMS network  
As the security issue in the BRAHMS network has to interwork with the other performance enhancing 
functional aspects just mentioned, the main problem is their compatibility with ML-IPSEC.  Since 
now the security service is provided on a “zone-by-zone” basis, individual security relationships can 
be used to cover each zone of the IP datagram, and then build a new type of Security Association 
(SA), called a Composite SA (CSA).  
With reference to Figure 6, when a user in Network A wants to establish a secure link with a node in 
Network B, the Security Gateway A (in the BSAT) establishes the necessary Security Associations 
with the Security Gateway B and with all authorized intermediate gateways (e.g. the security gateway 
in the BHS), before starting the actual data transaction.  The SAs constitute different levels of security 
relationships related to the negotiation of security services.  Before any IP datagram is sent through 
the untrustworthy Internet, the Security Gateway A in the BSAT encrypts and/or signs it, using an 
ML-IPSEC protocol.  When the datagram reaches Security Gateway B, it is decrypted and/or checked 
for authentication.  Then it is forwarded to the final destination in the Network B.  When the ML-
IPSEC protected datagram flows through an authorized intermediate node (e.g. BHS), if needed, a 
certain part of the datagram (e.g. the TCP header) may be decrypted and/or modified and re-
encrypted, but the other part will not be compromised.  In this scheme, the BHS performs, among 
others, the function of ML-IPSEC PEP-Gateway, having the key needed to decrypt the TCP header 
part and therefore perform RSVP, TCP spoofing, header compression, etc.  
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Figure 6 Status of the IP Datagrams in the BRAHMS Network in presence of ML-IPSEC 
 
On the other hand, the BSAT always operates as an End Host Security Gateway because it is 
connected to the edge of a Trusted Network.  The status of the IP datagram while travelling in the 
network is shown in Figure 7.  The different encryption and security levels applied at any specific 
node of the network can be easily identified. 
Figure 7 shows the different nodes of the BRAHMS reference architecture and the message sequence 
chart characterizing the encryption/decryption phases in an ML-IPSEC mode.  The following steps 
can be identified: 
• The User (Network A) asks to create a secure connection with a node in the Network B (e.g. an IP 
server).  Before transmitting the IP-datagram, the security requirements are established (CSA) and 
the network gateways are informed.  
• The BSAT performs QoS management and TCP spoofing, then it authenticates and encrypts the 
IP datagram by using two different keys (K1 and K2). If needed, it performs header compression 
on the IP Header (it might be noticed that, because of the previous encryption of the whole TCP 
segment, the TCP header is no longer available for header compression).  Finally it transmits the 
datagram to the BHS through the satellite.  
• Because of the encryption, IP security level is assured on the satellite link.  
• The BHS performs header decompression and operates a partial decryption on the received 
datagram using K1.  Before forwarding the datagram, if needed, it operates QoS management and 
then, in order to ensure security during the transit over the Internet, re-encrypts the TCP header 
using K1.  
The Security GW is an end-host that is able to properly decrypt all the IP datagram.  When data are 
transmitted from the IP server (Network B) to the end user (Network A) the BSAT and the BHS 
maintain their functions of End Host Security Gateway (BSAT) and of Intermediate PEP Security 
Gateway (BHS), but their specific processing is modified to reflect the change of direction of the data 
flow (e.g. TCP spoofing in this case is carried out by the BHS). It can be noticed that the partial “K1 
re -encryption” occurring on the satellite link is optional and does not modify the overall ML-IPSEC 
scheme.  In addition, the process described in Figure 6 could be simplified if some operations (i.e. 
header compression/decompression, spoofing, etc.) are not implemented.  
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Figure 7 MSC of the encryption/decryption phases in BRAHMS ML-IPSEC mode 
 
 
3. IP MULTICAST SECURITY 
3.1. IP multicast concept 
As shown in Figure 8, IP multicast is an Internet protocol that enables transmission of data packets to 
a group of receivers.  IP multicast makes efficient use of bandwidth by setting up a mid-point between 
unicast traffic (one-to-one) and broadcast IP traffic (one-to-all in a network).  This is well suited for 
one-to-many or many-to-many bulk data transfer or multimedia (audio/video) streaming transmission 
to a large number of heterogeneous receivers.  IP multicast efficiently supports this type of 
transmission by enabling sources to transmit a single copy of a message to a group of interested 
receivers.  
This mode of transmission scales well with increasing number of receivers, unlike in the unicast case 
(one-to-one), where the source has to send an individual copy of a message to each interested receiver 
and so performance is limited by sender bandwidth.  IP multicast is also more efficient than IP 
broadcasting (one-to-many), since in broadcasting a copy of a message is sent to all receivers, 
including receivers who may not want to receive the message.  More so, in the broadcast case 
messages are limited to a single subnet (to avoid flooding the entire Internet) compared to the 
multicast case (where receivers choose to join/leave different groups as they wish). 
IP multicast can be described as the transmission of an IP datagram to a host group: this is a set of 
zero or more hosts identified by a single IP destination address.  A multicast datagram is delivered to 
all members of its destination host group with the same best- effort reliability as regular unicast IP 
datagrams.  The membership of a host group is dynamic; that is, hosts may join and leave groups at 
any time.  There is no restriction on the location or number of members in a host group.  A host may 
be a member of more than one group at a time.  In addition, a single group IP address may have more 
than one data stream on different port numbers (or different sockets in more than one application at 
the application layer). 
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 Figure 8 Basic Multicast transmission module 
For each host group, a multicast address is allocated.  Users can have group memberships by joining 
particular multicast groups.  The membership and other information of each group is processed and 
maintained across the entire WAN or internetwork.  A multicast tree is introduced to establish and 
maintain the fabric of the multicast internetwork. 
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Figure 9 IP Multicast protocol stack 
In order to support native IP multicast, both the sending and receiving nodes and network 
infrastructure between them must be multicast enabled, including the intermediate routers.  Native IP 
multicast at an end host requires support for IP multicast and delivery of data packets at the TCP/IP 
protocol stack (see Figure 9). 
3.1.1. Multicast Addressing and scoping 
Multicast Internet addresses have been introduced for IP multicast to define multicast host groups. 
These are Class D addresses and the high order bits of their first octet are “1110”.  This means that all 
IP Multicast-group addresses will fall in the range: 224.0.0.0 - 239.255.255.255.  There are reserved 
link-local addresses from 224.0.0.0 to 224.0.0.255, which are used by network protocols on a local 
network segment and packets with them will never be forwarded by router.  These reserved addresses 
are always transmitted with a time-to-live (TTL) of 1. 
This address range is used only for the destination address of IP Multicast traffic.  The source address 
for multicast datagrams is always the unicast source address.  Sources send out their datagrams to the 
multicast host group address that they have joined, and receivers listen on the group address for 
incoming packets. 
The term scope refers to the region in which the data unit is forwarded. The scope of IP multicast can 
be unlimited.  However, some algorithms have been employed to limit multicast scope for the 
following reasons: 
• Limitat flooded network regions; 
• To support multicast address reuse; 
• Ensure privacy. 
Some multicast routing protocols such as DVMRP use broadcast to initiate the multicast tree.  
Limiting scope can prevent this temporarily flooding over the whole network.  Multicast address reuse 
enables multicast to be used multiple times, so long as the domain of the groups does not overlap.  
Finally, by scoping the multicast groups, it can be helpful to guarantee a certain degree of privacy, 
e.g. users out of the scope cannot join the multicast group.  
There are two main mechanisms used for scoping: 
• Scoping based on TTL value; 
• Administrative scoping. 
The TTL parameter is used to specify how many routers the packet can pass before dropped. 
Therefore, the maximum lifetime of an IP packet can be defined when it comes in the network. 
Administrative scoping has not been used widely.  This mechanism defines the scope of the multicast 
group by specifying groups of multicast addresses for different administrative regions. Only members 
of an administration region can join the corresponding group. 
3.1.2.  Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) and multicast routing 
IGMP is a protocol that gives a host the ability to support multicasting.  It works between a host and 
the immediately neighbouring multicast router.  The router then uses a multicast routing protocol to 
establish or join a multicast tree for connection to the source.  The current IETF IGMP is version 2 
(RFC 2236). 
IGMP is used to manage the multicast groups.  It enables the multicast router to track the membership 
information by using two types of IGMP massages: host membership query and host membership 
report.  A host membership query is sent out periodically by a multicast router to determine which 
multicast group has members on the local network.  The query is sent to 224.0.0.1 (all multicast group 
members in local network), and hosts generate a corresponding host membership report to indicate to 
the router to which multicast group they belong.  Hence the multicast router can establish a table to 
record the relationships of all hosts and groups.  When a host want to join a multicast group, it 
immediately transmits a join-group report for that group rather than waiting for a query.  When a host 
want to leave a group, it sends a leave-group report to the multicast router.  
IGMP only provides management services between a host and the nearest router.  The multicast router 
employs multicast routing protocols to establish and maintain the connection between senders and 
receivers.  
Unlike IP routing (where routing table information, stored in routers, is used to determine optimal 
transmission paths for forwarding messages), IP multicast routing is much more complex.  In IP 
multicast, the sender is not concerned with the number or location of clients.  Instead the network 
undertakes to deliver to all group members and minimise needless transmission to parts of the 
network where there is no receiver interest.  To do this the multicast-capable designated routers 
construct a spanning-tree (delivery tree), replacing the simple path in unicast, which is routed at each 
sender to the group.  The spanning-tree approach ensures that there is only one path between every 
pair of routers and it is free of endless loops.  Routers located at the branches duplicate the incoming 
messages and send copies down the branches where there are group members. 
There are a number of multicast routing protocols which can be categorized into two classes: one is 
intra-domain protocols such as Distance-Vector Multicast Routing Protocol (DVMRP), Multicast 
Extensions to Open Shortest Path First (MOSPF), Protocol-Independent Multicast Dense Mode (PIM-
DM) and Sparse Mode (PIM-SM), and Core Based Trees (CBT), and the other is inter-domain 
protocols such as Border Gateway Multicast Protocol (BGMP). 
3.2. IP multicast over satellite 
The development and investment in broadband communications and networks over satellite in recent 
years has been mainly based on three approaches: bent-pipe, ATM or ATM-like fast packet 
technology, and DVB for broadcasting.  None of these were originally designed to support IP 
multicast, but they have now been adapted to support IP multicast over satellites. 
Therefore, there are now several obvious options to support IP, depending on the available satellite 
systems and technologies:  
(1) IP over bent-pipe (transparent) satellite;  
(2) IP over ATM, and; 
(3)  IP over DVB. 
If networks evolve towards an all-IP solution, a further option is an all-IP satellite with on-board 
router. Such an option will need a significant amount of new system design, replacing the ATM and 
DVB switches with an on-board router, and will need to convince industry to develop and deploy 
satellite payload systems based on the new router technology instead of existing technologies.  The 
benefit of an IP-router-in-the-sky approach is that the routing algorithm can be used to integrate the 
satellite links in an IP multicast routing tree, as first mile connections, transit connections or last mile 
connections.  
To reflect the requirements of different types of services and applications, IP multicast over satellite 
should address the topic of security, which is important for the widespread use of multicast and its 
commercial success, and the rest of this paper considers this topic.  
3.3. The IP multicast model and security 
The anonymous-receiver model that underlies IP Multicast is attractive precisely because the 
distribution tree is easily extendible, subject to the resources available to the multicast routing 
protocol.  Any host in a subnet can join a multicast group without its subnet router passing 
identification information about the host to other routers upstream in the distribution tree.  This allows 
IP Multicast to scale to a large number of participating hosts.  The extendibility of the distribution tree 
in IP Multicast makes the IP Multicast model very attractive from the perspective of scalability.  
However, from the perspective of security, additional mechanisms and services must be built atop the 
basic IP Multicast model.  This decoupling of security from the IP Multicast model is advantageous, 
since it allows differing security models and architectures to be deployed, without affecting the 
multicast distribution tree which delivers the multicast data end-to-end.  
This decoupling is also important from the application’s perspective, since each application requires 
different forms of host information and other security parameters, and may deploy differing user-
identification and user-authentication mechanisms.  
As shown in Figure 10, there are several interrelated factors or aspects of IP Multicast that influence 
the approaches and mechanisms used to secure it. Of these, some broad and most relevant factors 
include: 
• Multicast application type; 
• Group dynamics; 
• Scalability issues; 
• Underlying trust model.  
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Figure 10 Factors affecting secure multicast system design 
Since these factors and others are interrelated, it is difficult to portray their specific relationships and 
influences.  However, Figure 10 displays one view of the problem/solution space, which is made up of 
these factors (group dynamics falling under scalability).  
4. SECURE MULTICAST OVER SATELLITES 
A significant issue in multicast security is key management: all members of a multicast group need to 
be given keys that enable them to decrypt traffic.  It is then necessary update these keys occasionally, 
for reasons described below in Section 4.1. 
There are many architectures for key management, one of them being based on the IETF key 
management draft [HACD00].  In order to support multicast groups; the domain is divided into a 
number of administratively scoped “areas”.  A host-member of a multicast group is defined to reside 
within one (and only one) of these areas.  The purpose of placing host-members in areas is to achieve 
flexible and efficient key management, particularly in the face of the problem of changes (joins and 
leaves) in the membership of a multicast group. 
In [IYEN01], we investigated the idea of defining the satellite network as a single domain, which can 
be divided into administratively scoped areas.  Each area could be mapped into a single spot beam.  
Area control keys are used to distribute group keys.  However, because the system uses a set of N 
pairwise keys to manage key updates, the overheads of rekeying due to group membership changes 
are high in terms of satellite transmissions and do not scale well.  This problem can be mitigated using 
the alternative approach of the Logical Key Hierarchy [LKHW99], which we discuss later in this 
Section. 
4.1. Multicast rekeying issues 
Confidentiality is ensured by encrypting traffic sent over the satellite links using a key, referred to 
here as the group key. Rekeying occurs for the following reasons: 
(1) The group key is updated regularly (typically every few seconds or minutes) to reduce the 
probability of successful cryptanalysis of the encrypted traffic. 
(2) The group key may also need to be changed on demand if it is determined that the key has been 
compromised. 
(3) Rekeying may be required when a new user joins the multicast group.  This ensures that the user 
cannot decrypt encoded traffic that was sent prior to their joining (this is called reverse secrecy). 
(4) Rekeying may be required when an existing user departs from the multicast group.  This ensures 
that the user cannot decrypt encoded traffic that is sent after they leave (this is called forward 
secrecy). 
For large multicast groups (that have frequent membership changes) the cost of rekeying can be 
significant, since satellite resources are expensive.  Scalable rekeying is therefore an important 
problem that needs to be considered in order to support secure communications for large dynamic 
groups.  We now proceed to investigate rekey techniques for each of the four functions listed above. 
Several techniques exist for rekeying (1) and (3) above: two options are for the new group key to be 
encrypted with either (a) the old group key, or (b) a separate “control” key negotiated during session 
establishment. 
For (2) and (4) above a different rekeying approach is required since the old key is known by at least 
one user who is no longer to be a recipient of the multicast transmission.  We assume that as each user 
joins, a unique pairwise key is shared between the source and the user.  Let us first consider a key 
management system of N pairwise keys each shared between the key manager and a user (Figure 11a).  
The pairwise key associations are represented by the circles and the group key is represented by the 
box labelled ‘A’.  If the group key is changed the new group key is encrypted with each user’s unique 
pairwise key and then unicast to that user; each of these encrypted keys is represented by one of the 
lines drawn in Figure 11a.  Thus for N users a total of N encrypted keys are generated and transmitted 
across the satellite network.  The disadvantages of this approach are that it does not scale well for the 
large multicast groups that a satellite system can be expected to cater for, and it is expensive in its use 
of satellite network resources. 
4.1.1. Logical key hierarchy 
A hierarchical tree [LKHW99] provides a more scalable approach.  Here a tree of keys is used: in 
Figure 11b the keys are labelled A through O, the circles represent the pairwise keys, and the lines 
each represent encrypted keys sent across the network, as we shall now see.  Suppose that User 11 
needs to be deleted from the multicast group.  Then all of the keys held by User 11 (keys F, K, N, O) 
must be changed and distributed to the users who need them, without permitting User 11 to obtain 
them or anyone else who is not entitled to them.  To do this, we must replace the keys held by User 
11, proceeding from the bottom up. 
The server chooses a new key for the lowest node, then transmits it encrypted with the appropriate 
daughter keys.  Thus for this example, the first key replaced is Key F, and this new key will be sent 
encrypted with User 12's unique pairwise key.  The second key replaced is Key K, which is sent 
encrypted with the newly replaced Key F (for User 12) and also sent encrypted with key E (for Users 
9 and 10).  Key N is then sent encrypted in the newly replaced Key K (for Users 9, 10, and 12) and 
also encrypted in key L (shared by Users 13 through 16).  Finally, Key O is replaced, and this new 
key is sent encrypted in the newly replaced Key N (for Users 9, 10, and 12 through 16) and also 
separately is encrypted in key M (shared by Users 1 to 8).  Since we are proceeding from the bottom 
up, each of the replacement keys will have been replaced before it is used to encrypt another key.  
The seven keys sent represent a significant saving on the 16 keys that would need to be transmitted 
using the flat key system of Figure 11a.  In general, the number of transmissions required is the sum 
of the degrees of the replaced nodes. In a k-ary tree in which a sits at depth d, this comes to 
1log1 −=− Nkkd k  transmissions. 
The system is robust against collusion, in that no set of users together can read any message unless 
one of them could have read it individually.  Alternatively, multiple keys can be sent in one message, 
provided that there exists a means for each user to determine which key in the message corresponds to 
which node of the hierarchy.  Taking into account the per-message overheads, it can be shown that a 
single multicast message uses the fewest bits to transmit the new keys. 
 
 
 
A C D E F G H B 
I J K L 
M N 
O 
 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9   10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
A 
 1    2    3    4    5    6    7    8    9   10  11  12  13  14  15  16 
Key 
hierarchy 
Users 
Key 
Users 
(a) (b) 
Group key 
Group key 
 
Figure 11 Key hierarchies: (a) N pairwise keys (left); (b) hierarchical tree (right)  
 
In the case of compromised keys, (2) above, all compromised keys must be rekeyed: The cost of this 
will vary between 1)(log −Nk k  (the cost of removing one user) up to 1
)1(
−
−
k
Nk
 (assuming all keys in 
the hierarchy are compromised). 
4.2. Rekeying and security policy 
The security policy for each multicast group determines the frequency of group key regular updates, 
and whether or not rekeying is required for user joins and departs.  As an example of this, there are a 
number of alternatives to rekeying on a user depart, and these are briefly discussed below.  We 
assume that a user is connected to the satellite network via an earth station (ES): 
• Do not rekey when a user leaves a group: if the ES is trusted not to forward data for a 
multicast group then this is the simplest option, involving no cost of either network traffic or 
key generation. 
• Disable keys in the ES when it leaves the multicast group: the ES is trusted to actively destroy 
the keys it holds; once it has done this it is unable to decrypt the multicast group traffic. 
• Rekey when a user departs from the multicast group: this is option (4) above.  Although it is 
the most secure alternative, it has the disadvantage that when there are a large number of 
group members, changing the key on each departure may be a heavy processing load on the 
key server, and is unlikely to scale. 
• Periodic rekeying: this is different from option (1) above, since here the intention is to bundle 
together a number of departing users and effectively rekey them simultaneously.  This 
reduces the total rekey workload and increases the scalability of the multicast group, 
especially large dynamic groups, as has been illustrated by the Kronos system [SETI 00]. 
5. INTERWORKING BETWEEN ML-IPSEC AND LKH 
We now present an extension of the logical key hierarchy discussed in Section 4.1 that provides an 
efficient and scalable key management system for multicast ML-IPSEC.  We consider the BRAHMS 
network model of Figure 6, and analyse an IP datagram that is being multicast from a user on network 
A to a user (or users) on network B.  We briefly review the operation of ML-IPSEC.  The security 
gateway on the BSAT encrypts the TCP header using a group key K1, and encrypts the TCP data 
content using a different group key K2, giving the encrypted datagram structure shown in Figure 5.  
The datagram is transmitted over the satellite link and is received by the BHS; here, the Security 
Gateway C (in the BHS) has group key K1 and can decrypt the TCP/UDP header and perform QoS / 
throughput optimisation.  The datagram (with the TCP header re-encrypted using K1) is then 
forwarded on to the destination network (or networks) where Security Gateway B holds both K1 and 
K2, and can therefore fully decrypt the datagram.  The datagram is fully secured when transmitted 
over the satellite link and the public Internet 
In summary, it can be seen that the security gateways at the ends of the connection (i.e. at the source 
and at each destination of a multicast transmission) need both group keys K1 and K2.  However, 
intermediate security gateways that are responsible for QoS and throughput optimisation only need 
access to group key K1 to enable them to read and if necessary change the TCP/UDP header. 
The two group keys K1 and K2 could be managed using two separate logical key hierarchies, but a 
saving can be made by integrating them into a single hierarchy as follows: Figure 12 shows the 
proposed key hierarchy for a set of users U1 to U8 and a set of intermediate gateways GW1 to GW8.  
All users and intermediate gateways are members of the multicast group.  The group key K1 used to 
encrypt the transport layer header is at the root of the tree, and the group key K2 used to encrypt the 
data is one of the root’s two child keys.  Recalling that in a logical key hierarchy each member only 
knows the keys that lie on the path from the member’s leaf node to the root, it can be seen that users 
have access to both K1 and K2, while gateways only have access to K1. 
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Figure 12 Integrated LKH tree for ML-IPSEC 
If there are NU users and NGW intermediate gateways, then the cost of rekeying for this binary tree is 
1)(log2 2 −+ GWU NN  keys.  For large numbers of users this is almost half the number of rekeys 
that would be required to rekey two separate hierarchical trees, 2log2log2 22 −+ GWU NN .  In 
general, the subtrees whose roots are at nodes M and N can each be trees of out-degree k (the two 
subtrees may even have different out-degrees from each other). 
6. CONCLUSION  
This paper has examined the BRAHMS and GEOCAST security architectures, and has described 
IPSEC, Multi Layer IPSEC and secure multicast over satellites.  The paper has illustrated the Logical 
Key Hierarchy (LKH), which can be used to manage key distribution for very large and dynamic 
multicast groups. 
Finally the paper presented an interworking solution between ML-IPSEC and LKH, where the end 
users are put into one branch of the LKH tree and the satellite terminals are put into another branch.  
The root key in the LKH tree can be used for securing the transport header and a branch key secures 
the data content for the end users.  The proposed scheme is scalable, in that the rekey effort varies 
with Nlog , and efficient, in that the number of rekeys required is half that of two separate tree 
hierarchies. 
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